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Corporate
Audit Committees

• promote independent, critical,
creative thought
• raise the level of internal
financial control
• improve the quality of reported
financial information

Gregory M. Boni
Partner

Touche Ross & Co.
December, 1970

Two facts of corporate life are that
• the public lacks confidence in much of the
reported financial information, and
• corporate directors bear responsibility for,
and may incur liability as a result of, misleading financial information.
To solve these very real problems, several professional and regulatory groups have proposed
that public corporations use audit committees
made up of members of their boards of
directors.
(1)

We at Touche Ross have actively supported the
position taken by these groups—that corporate
audit committees can greatly promote the
public and corporate good. Further, we have
sponsored extensive research in this field by
Professors R. K. Mautz and F. L . Neumann,
both of the University of Illinois. Results of
their research are now being published.
(2,3)

We recommend that publicly-owned companies
have audit committees and that they consist
largely of outside directors. We recommend
that each committee be organized in a manner
carefully calculated to make it effective in advancing corporate responsibility. Privatelyowned companies that issue financial statements
to outsiders (e.g. for credit purposes) should
also follow this recommendation.
(1) The Executive Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued in July,
1967, a recommendation that audit committees be
formed. In November, 1968, a committee of the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants made
recommendations for legislation that would make
such committees mandatory for publicly-owned companies. The New York Stock Exchange, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and other regulatory
bodies have given attention to the need for audit
committees.
(2) Corporate Audit Committees: A Research Report by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann (to be published; Bureau of Economic and Business Research,
University of Illinois).
(3) The effective corporate audit committee, by R.
K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann (Harvard Business
Review, November-December, 1970).
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Issues concerning the composition and the objectives of corporate audit committees, and
questions concerning the scope and manner of
their operation are discussed herein. Part of
the material presented here, together with the
supporting data, will appear in the report on
the Mautz-Neumann research study. However,
in certain respects, the emphasis in this monograph differs from that of the research study.
Why Have an Audit Committee?
The recently issued court opinion in the BarChris case has focused attention on the very
real responsibility of directors for public reporting of financial information; from this responsibility, extensive legal liability may be
incurred. Outside directors ordinarily are in
a relatively poor position to be able to assume
this responsibility. Their contact with financial
information at full board meetings is ordinarily
superficial. Little time is available — on the
agenda of a busy board—for a careful review of
accounting and financial controls.
(4)

If an outside director is to intelligently undertake financial responsibilities, he must have
background on the structure and nature of financial controls applied within the company.
He must also have knowledge of the alternative
generally accepted accounting principles that
may be appropriate within the industry.
And his knowledge of accounting principles
must be up to date—he must be aware of the
rapidly changing environment being brought
about by new pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA.
Many outside directors have expressed the need
for personal contact with the independent CPAs
of their company. Further, many would extend
this personal contact to officers and employees
(4) See Federal Securities Law Reporter, Commerce
Clearing House, '67-'69 Decisions, Transfer Binder
Supp., ¶92,179.
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responsible for financial functions at the corporate and divisional levels as well as to those
engaged in the internal audit function.
In recent years, discovery of misleading or erroneous published financial information has
made newspaper headlines and has been the
subject of articles in magazines widely read in
the financial community. In years gone by,
probably only the McKesson and Robbins case
attracted as much attention as have some recently publicized cases. Between the time of
the McKesson case and the next one to reach
wide public attention there was a long interval.
Now, the financial community is seeing an
accelerating number of financial reporting
problems, a fact which necessarily affects the
credibility of all published financial information.
At annual stockholders' meetings, questions are
often directed to the officers of the company,
and to its CPAs, indicating the concern of stockholders about the company's financial controls
and about the nature of the audit performed by
the CPAs. Many stockholders believe that the
necessarily extensive relations between the officers of a corporation and the partners of its
accounting firm are too close. They then raise
questions of independence, and of domination
over financial reporting by management.
The question of independence is also affected
by the situations where there have been sudden
replacements of one auditing firm by another.
There is concern whether the independent certified public accountant has an adequate channel within the company to convey his thoughts
to non-management directors about important
issues.
Stockholders want assurance that the function
of financial control over assets is under the
surveillance of members of the board. Even
though in specific instances there are no facts
to support the doubts expressed, the credibility
problem does exist—and credibility does influence stockholders, as it should.
3

The problems of improved reporting and of
adequate controls are not shadows in the public
mind. Directors have responsibility for these
problems, and their potential legal liabilities
can not and should not be discounted.
Appropriate attention at the policy level is
needed to bring about substantive improvements in both reporting and control. Corporate
policies concerning accounting and control are
the base upon which rests the quality of these
functions. Financial officers often become more
effective when members of the board are deeply
interested in financial reporting and controls.
Who should generate the impetus to better financial reporting and control? While the profession should be continuously responsive to
the needs of the financial community, there are
areas of improvement that must come from the
companies themselves.
If a board is to support accounting and control
policies relating to complex matters, the board
must first understand the issues involved. For
many directors, even a comprehension of the
responsibilities CPAs express in their opinions
on financial statements can only come from
personal exposure. Such matters as the bases
used for valuing assets, setting up reserves,
providing for depreciation, the significance of
footnotes—all these matters require extensive
personal exposure and contact on the part of
outside directors. To learn about the application of financial controls, they need information
that may be given to them by the company's
independent accountants, by the financial officers and employees of the company, and by
internal auditors.
The process of intelligent challenge of the company's accounting and control activities by the
directors—if a satisfactory means exists—may
catalyze important substantive improvements.
This, in turn, opens the way for independent
CPAs, for the financial officers and employees
of the company, and for the internal auditors
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to bring their recommendations to the attention
of the board of directors.
To summarize, there are compelling and urgent
needs:
• To aid directors in undertaking and fulfilling
their responsibilities for financial reporting to
the public;
• To cope with the corporate image problems
stemming from tarnished credibility in financial reporting;
• To support, at the highest level, efforts to
substantially improve both the financial
controls exercised over management and the
quality of public reporting;
• To provide better avenues of communication
between the board of directors and the external and internal auditors.
A corporate audit committee of competent nonmanagement directors can be responsive to all
of these needs. Some managements believe that
dealing with the independent CPAs is solely an
operating problem and not the concern of
members of the board. But the overall significance of the issues involved, and the fact
that management itself must be the subject for
internal control, argue that increased board concentration on the audit function is warranted.
Benefits flow from the corporate audit committee to stockholders, directors, management,
the independent CPA and the accounting profession. Stockholders are assured that the protection of corporate assets is being given top
level attention; stockholders also gain from the
impact of improved credibility in financial information. Directors are provided a mechanism
for the personal contact necessary to their
responsibilities. Management gets the benefit of
policy support for improved reporting and control practices and avoids the potential stigma
of having operated without independent financial controls. The independent auditor is assured an attentive audience at the policy level.
5

And the accounting profession benefits because the cumulative effects raise the level of
performance.
If a corporate audit committee is to yield its
potential benefits, it must be appropriately
organized, and it must be much more than a
conduit for financial statements from the auditors to the board.
Establishment and Composition
of Audit Committees
The audit committee should be established by
a resolution of the board of directors. The
resolution may be general, or it may set forth
in detail the objectives and scope of the committee. The significant factor is that the responsibilities of the committee should be stated
in writing. To develop an appropriate foundation for this written statement of scope, the
entire board should fully discuss the pros and
cons of an audit committee and the alternative
roles available to it.
Corporate audit committees are generally small,
and in many instances three members seem to
be enough. In some cases, perhaps particularly
because of the appropriate insistence of nonmanagement directors for personal participation, it may be wiser to establish larger committees. The committee should be appointed by
the board and should consist either largely or
entirely of non-management directors.
Practice indicates that the best qualifications for
an audit committee member are—perhaps to a
slightly higher degree than the typical board
member—an inquiring mind and breadth of
knowledge about corporate matters, including
experience in financial and general management
functions. Specific knowledge of auditing and
accounting is not necessary. The ability of the
chairman of the committee is apt to have a determining effect upon the success of its activities,
just as the skills of participants always influence
performance. The chairman should also have
conviction that the function of the committee is
6

useful. And he should have the inter-personal
skills to coordinate with management.
While communication to the committee from
officers is essential, this interrelationship may
be obtained by providing for the attendance of
officers during portions of audit committee
meetings. Conversely—to obtain full benefit—
if management directors are members of the
committee there should be a provision that they
withdraw from some part of the audit committee meetings.
Scope of Audit Committee Function
The scope of the committee's activities and the
manner in which the scope is determined may
have much to do with getting successful interaction between management and a corporate
audit committee. Some officers feel that financial reporting and controls are solely an operating problem and should not be interfered with
by directors. Clearly, the refutation of this position lies in the broad needs to be served. In
practice however, a clear definition of scope
will minimize difficulties from this source.
Further, to plan effectively, the audit committee
must have a clear definition of scope.
We recommend that a written statement covering the scope of audit committee activities be
developed. Although this may be done as part
of the resolution establishing the committee, we
suggest that the scope statement be prepared
after exploratory meetings heldfirstby the management and the audit committee, then by the
audit committee and the company's CPAs, and
finally by the audit committee and management.
A complete hearing of objectives and objections
can clarify expectations, promote understanding, foster modifications in scope and increase
the opportunity for satisfactory performance.
The activities of an audit committee may and
should include:
• Nomination or selection of the auditors
• Approval of the overall scope of the audit
• Review of results of the audit
• Review of the overall control mechanisms
7

The fourth category, control mechanisms, may
appear to be independent of the first three.
However, the audit committee must, in fact,
address itself to control. Otherwise it is impossible to evaluate what the audit by the independent CPAs has done to advance control
over the financial affairs of the company. The
only real choice is whether the audit committee
pursues the nature of control by questioning the
external auditors or by questioning the financial
officers, internal auditors and employees of
the company.
Nomination or selection of the auditors by the
audit committee tends to establish that auditors
are independent of management. The nomination of auditors ordinarily takes place when
stockholders directly vote upon the election of
the auditors, or when they ratify the action
taken by the board; in some instances the audit
committee's nomination will be ratified only
by the board.
There appears to be general agreement that the
more important accomplishment, when the
audit committee nominates or selects auditors,
is that the external auditors cannot be replaced
without the approval of the audit committee.
In this case it is most credible that the auditors
can stand up to management in the event of
disagreement. Accordingly, any statement of
scope should be clear as to the rights of the
audit committee in connection with the engagement and retention of the external auditors.
The overall scope of the audit. The audit begins
to pay off in improved financial reporting when
it is made responsive to the needs of the company. There may, of course, be specific problems within the company that some part of
management may believe the auditors will
examine in the ordinary course of events.
Others on the board may never have thought
about some of these problems. To establish the
existence of such problems, and to set specifications for the external audit, the audit committee must understand the internal control
function, including internal audit.
8

While a corporate audit committee should not
develop detailed audit procedures, such things
as the degree of audit coverage of subsidiaries
or divisions, the coverage of stores or plants, and
the coverage of foreign operations are certainly
matters for their review. The type of coverage
to be given to new acquisitions also falls in this
category as do special problems such as inventory obsolescence, credit circumstances, and
unusual trends in the industry. None of these
will be left to chance if they are brought up
with the auditors in a discussion about the
scope of work. A written memorandum of the
scope agreed upon may serve many useful
purposes in the future.
Review of results of the audit by the audit committee is presumably its most important contribution. It is here that the members of the
committee can learn in detail the auditors'
thoughts about the fairness of the financial
presentations. Because the wording of the shortform opinion obviously does not convey the
subtleties that would be useful to directors
in fulfilling their responsibilities, these subtleties should be communicated during personal
contact.
The review of the results of the audit should,
of course, cover not only the fairness of presentation of financial data, but also the external
auditors' opinion about controls, financial personnel, and general business matters. Some feel
that direct contact between directors and auditors on delicate matters may embarrass management and create situations difficult to resolve.
But the responsibility of the board is paramount
and overriding. Accordingly, following a review
with the external auditors, the audit committee
must transmit to the full board that information
which it considers pertinent. Based upon the
report given by its audit committee, the full
board then acts to approve the financial statements to be included in the annual report. The
board relies upon the audit committee members
to discharge their responsibility for adequate
reporting. It thus behooves the audit committee
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members to transmit all information that bears
on the directors' responsibilities.
Review of the system of internal control by
the audit committee better serves the purposes
of the company. Such a review necessarily includes directing audit activities to control problems. Audit activity for this purpose may be
expected to come from both the external and
internal auditors. Internal control, of course, is
a function of the system used, including checks
and balances that come from the structure of
the organization and the manner of assignment
of authorities and responsibilities.
When the scope of the corporate audit committee includes the internal control function, the
audit committee may give its fullest attention
to gaining the knowledge needed to optimize
the coordination of the external audit function
with internal activities. Where there is a significant internal audit function, as there should
always be, its effectiveness can be increased by
allowing it to make reports directly to the corporate audit committee.
Method of Operation
The development of a mode of operation should
begin with exploratory meetings. Each group
should frankly state what it visualizes may occur
and should provide the facts upon which to
develop an agenda.
Number and timing of meetings. Generally,
apart from initial and exploratory meetings,
there should be at least two audit committee
meetings with the external auditors every year.
At the year's first meeting, the agenda treats
what is to be expected during the coming audit;
at the second meeting, the findings of the audit
are reviewed and the financial statements are
received. There is much merit in holding this
second meeting shortly before the audit is completed—in the event questions arise that call
for further action by the auditors.
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Attendance. At audit committee meetings, the
independent C P A should minimally be represented by the partner in charge of the engagement and the staff man in charge of the field
work. In addition, particularly for larger clients,
it is quite appropriate that a senior partner not
directly connected with the engagement should
also attend. Such a senior partner may make
important contributions — discussing general
trends in accounting and auditing, evaluating
attitudes within the financial community, and
clarifying the economic backdrop against which
financial statements are being viewed and evaluated. His insights may also serve to sharpen
perception of the nature of any controversial
issues that may be encountered.

In the usual case where the membership of the
audit committee does not include management's
chief executive and financial officers, these men
should be invited to attend the discussions that
involve the presentation of findings and the implications attached to them. It is necessary, for
many reasons, that the audit committee have
the opportunity to evaluate the responses by
management both to the facts presented and
to the judgments made by the external auditors.

Where there is a significant internal audit function, it is appropriate that the chief internal auditor be present at both the meeting directed
towards setting specifications of the audit and
the one for reviewing the audit findings.

Whether officers serve on or have been invited
to an audit committee meeting, the meeting
should include some time when all management
personnel are excluded and only outside members of the audit committee and the. external
auditors are present. This gives the opportunity
to evaluate personnel, including top management, without restriction. It also permits intimate discussion of the implications of delicate
policy matters.
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Agendas should be developed much in advance,
so that all parties have ample time to prepare.
We recommend that the typical audit review
agenda be built around the following items:
1. Presentation by auditors of financial
statements
(a) General explanation of responsibilities assumed by the independent
auditors
(b) Comments concerning accounting
principles used, particularly those
affected by change
(c) Comments on interpretation of individual balance sheet items, including the potential for variation
as to amounts stated
(d) Comments on interpretation of financial results, including trends, explanations of trends and changes in
character of the business
(e) Comments about auditing problems,
including scope and results in important or sensitive areas
2. Presentation by auditors of comments
and recommendations on internal control
(a) Management letter, if preparation is
possible in time for the meeting
(b) General evaluation of organization
3. Discussion of new APB pronouncements
and of APB pending items and general
accounting trends
4. Comments about service other than auditing performed during year
The external auditors will benefit from reference to written material used during their oral
presentations. At the least, a record of points
to be covered should be given to members of
the audit committee.
Any attempt to develop in writing all the discussion that is contemplated can, at the least,
be very uneconomical. More importantly, the
written material should tend only to focus discussion, not to limit and restrict a free interchange of thoughts.
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Expected A P B pronouncements and trends
should not be treated in technical detail. Rather, there should be a very brief discussion of
such matters that are pertinent to the client's
general affairs.
Internal control activities must be explored, but
the means must be accommodated to the situation. As previously discussed, the audit committee may choose to learn about internal control from the independent CPAs. On the other
hand, the responsibility of the committee may
call more directly for personal contact with
internal auditors, chief financial officers at the
corporate level and financial officers at divisional levels.
Establishing internal control as an item on the
agenda contributes to efficient coverage of the
function. Depending upon the multiplicity of
control areas that exist, and the degree of depth
that carrying out the scope of the committee requires, an extensive discussion of internal control may be needed. In some cases, several
exploratory meetings should be held simply to
resolve the scope of this agenda item.
Because today's information and control systems are so integrated, contacts might also be
wanted with functional officers outside the accounting and finance function.
Conclusion
A corporate audit committee—properly staffed
and chartered, and acting in a fertile environment—will promote independent, critical and
creative thought, will raise the level of internal
financial control, and will improve the quality
of reported financial information. In addition,
all parties—the public, stockholders, management, directors, auditors and governmental
bodies—will have justifiably increased confidence in the fairness and adequacy of the company's financial reports. We confidently expect
that the corporate audit committee will come
to be recognized as one of the essentials of
enlightened managements.
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QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE
ASKED INDEPENDENT CPAs
BY AN AUDIT COMMITTEE
(5)

These illustrations are based on actual situations
and are not intended to be all inclusive. With every
question, the context in which the question is
asked—the extent of an audit committee member's
background knowledge in the particular area and
in financial and audit matters in general, the financial condition of the company and the quality of
its finance, accounting and internal auditing personnel—will certainly influence the form of the
question and the nature of the response.

Audit scope and results
1. Do the independent public accountants believe that the scope of the examination is
appropriate in the circumstances? Did management attempt to, or, in fact, place any
restrictions on the scope of the examination
and its implementation? Were there any
major additions to or deletions from the audit
program as compared with last year?
2. Did the independent public accountants audit
all of the company's units, whether consolidated or unconsolidated? If not, which were
omitted and why?
3. What type of work is performed by the independent public accountants in the case of
business acquisitions?
4. Do the independent public accountants regularly rotate the staff on the engagement?
5. Have the independent public accountants
noted any indications of a possible change in
the character of the business?
(5) In large measure, these questions are taken from
two actually-used listings contained in a full account
of the Research Study sponsored by the Touche Ross
Foundation. See footnote (2) on page 1.
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6. Are there any serious internal control weaknesses outstanding? What recommendations
have been made by the independent public
accountants relating to internal control, organization, operations, and internal reporting, and what action has management taken
regarding such recommendations?
7. How cooperative were company personnel?
8. What is the opinion of the independent public accountants as to the quality of the accounting and financial staffs? Is the company's internal audit staff adequate?
9. What is the quality of the long-range planning and budgetary controls employed by
the company?
10. Does the company use its electronic data
processing equipment effectively?
11. Is the company's policy and procedure manual reasonably formal and maintained on a
current basis?
12. What have the independent public accountants done to determine any possible conflict
of interest? Are company procedures designed
to avoid such conflicts adequate in the circumstances?
13. Has the management ever exceeded its authority in any matters prescribed by the directors, or failed to comply with any resolution passed by the directors?

Financial statements—assets
1. For what periods are the company's time deposits committed? What are the company's
compensating balance requirements?
2. Has the quoted market of the company's
short-term investments changed significantly
since year end? And what is the current thinking about carrying such investments at quoted
market?
3. Why is the allowance for doubtful receivables lower than last year despite an increase
in receivables? What is the average age of
accounts compared to a year ago, and how is
the change explained? Is the company following an appropriate credit policy? Are there
15

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
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any large individual amounts where collectibility is in question? Are any of these receivables for an extended time period? Have
any receivables been discounted or pledged?
Are there any receivables from officers or
other management employees?
Are inventory physical controls adequate?
Has the LIFO method of valuing inventories
been considered?
What steps have the independent public accountants taken with respect to inventories at
outside locations?
Does the company generate internal reports
on the condition of inventories, so that timely
action can be taken with respect to possible
obsolescence? Were any significant writedowns incurred? Generally, what have the
outside auditors done to satisfy themselves
that the inventory as stated on the balance
sheet does not contain obsolete or excess
stock?
What is the basis of valuation of long-term
investments? Is the valuation more or less
than quoted market?
How does the company's equity in foreign
companies compare with cost? How much is
really at risk when intercompany receivables
and temporary advances are considered? How
does the company effectively hedge its exposure?
Why does the company use accelerated
methods of depreciation for some items but
not for others? Why is the same method of
depreciation used for book and tax purposes?
Is the company's policy regarding the differentiation between capital and expense items
still responsive to its needs?
Does the company have any significant proposed leases which might require capitalization?
Is the company policy regarding amortization
of intangible assets realistic? Should the company consider prospective amortization of
goodwill arising from acquisitions before
November 1, 1970?

Financial statements—
liabilities and stockholders' equity
1. What is the status of Federal income taxes,
such as open years and items in dispute? Does
the accrual for Federal income taxes appear
to be adequate to cover possible assessments
upon examination by the IRS?
2. Has the company complied with debt indenture obligations, or have waivers been required?
3. Are there any restrictions pertaining to senior
stock issues that effectively limit company
activities? Are there retained earnings restrictions of any kind? Has the company purchased any treasury stock during the year,
and, if so, for what purposes?
4. Has the company made any charges or credits
directly to stockholders' equity? Why?
5. What is the company's policy on funding
past service liabilities relating to retirement
plans? Over what period of time is past service being amortized? What amount of the
total past service liability has been funded?
Has the company's practice followed a consistent pattern?
6. Are there any contingencies of a legal or
other nature as to which the appropriate treatment, provision or mere disclosure, was in
doubt?
7. Has the company made any unusual commitments regarding, for example, the purchase of inventories, or the acquisition or
construction of property assets? How well
does the company's capital budgeting system
seem to be working?

Financial statements—general
1. Are other companies in the industry giving
more or less information than we are planning to give in the financial statements and
elsewhere in our report?
2. Why are general and administrative costs
allocated in arriving at segmented operating
results? Can there be further refinement in
directly identifying costs now allocated?
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3. Have there been any significant changes in
the company's accounting practices in the
year? Do all of the company's accounting
practices fall within generally accepted accounting principles? Where "free choice" alternate principles are available, which are
being used by the company? What would be
the impact of using the other available
choices? Are the company's accounting practices appropriate for its specific needs?
4. Were there any unusual items reflected in the
operating results for the year? Are any of the
operations incurring a loss?
5. Were there any prior-year adjustments? What
was the rationale in so treating them?
6. What are the reasons for excluding specified
subsidiary companies from full consolidations, and what are the prospects for changes?
7. Were there any transactions with non-subsidiary affiliated or related companies?
8. How are earnings per share computed? Why
don't the quarterly figures add up to the
cumulative figure?
9. Are there any adopted or proposed Accounting Principle Board opinions or Securities
and Exchange Commission requirements that
will materially affect the company's accounting methods orfinancialposition in the near
future? Has there been full compliance with
existing opinions and requirements?
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